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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates three of the options available to 
provide adequate and affordable family housing to Navy 
families in the continental United States. Current Department 
of Defense policy is compared to both the public/private 
option and the downsizing of housing assets (with pay and 
allowance changes) option. Quantitative and qualitative 
issues are addressed, as are the advantages and disadvantages 
of each option. 
As a result of this analysis, this study recommends that 
the Department of Defense revise the Variable Housing 
Allowance (VHA) determination procedures, revise the housing 
deficit determination procedures, and eliminate the scoring of 
public/private ventures. Further, this study concludes that 
the Department of Defense has an economic justification for 
providing on-base housing. Efforts should be directed toward 
"right-sizing" housing assets rather than downsizing, with 
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I. INTRODUCTIOR 
A. BACKGROUND 
Roughly twenty-four percent of Navy families presently 
reside in on-base family housing (Ref 13]. The Department of 
Defense proposes to increase this to approximately thirty-
eight percent in the years ahead (Ref 4:p. 32]. This would be 
a natural evolution as the Forces are downsized, with housing 
assets retiring at a slower rate than the force drawdown. As 
an alternative to the Department of Defense's present plan, 
the Congressional Budget Office proposes pay and allowance 
changes to encourage Navy fami 1 ies to reside in the 1 ocal 
community, thus saving the government money and providing a 
higher quality of housing to the families (Ref 4]. With these 
alternatives in mind, Congress has finished work on a $10 
billion military construction budget for fiscal year 1994 that 
includes slightly over one billion dollars for Navy family 
housing in the continental United States. A little more than 
$345 million would be for new construction, with an additional 
$665 mi 11 ion to be used for operations, maintenance and 
utilities costs for existing Navy family housing. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the 
importance family housing plays on the morale of the Navy 
member, and believes on-base housing compliments the overall 
1 
compensation package they can offer and enhances their effort~ 
to recruit and retain quality personnel in today' s all-
val unteer force. The Department of Defense expresses the 
current shortage of family housing as alarming, especially in 
the more than thirty communities it has designated as 
"critical housing" areas, eighteen of which are located in the 
continental United States (CONUS) (Ref 12]. Cities such as 
San Diego and Washington, D.C. are included in this category. 
The critical housing areas have long waits for obtaining on-
base housing, as well as minimal affordable housing within the 
established criteria of a one hour commute to the base. The 
Department of Defense is interested in reducing the hardships 
on military families assigned to high cost housing areas. 
The 1 arge budget deficits and reductions in mi 1 i tary 
spending following the end of the Cold War have forced the 
Department of Defense to pursue all options available to 
provide affordable housing to the military member. The 
Department of Defense's curt"ent pol icy is to retain and 
maintain as many existing housing assets as feasible, wl.. ·.1 e 
continuing with the proposed new family housing construction 
program. Naturally, the percentage of personnel living in on-
base housing would increase as family housing assets would be 
retired at a slower rate than the personnel drawdowns. The 
number of Department of Defense housing assets is projected to 
decline by four percent by 1999, while the number of military 
families stationed in the continental United States is 
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projected to decline by 27 percent. The net effect will be an 
increase in the percentage of families residing in on-base 
housing [Ref 4:p. 32]. 
The Department of Defense also endorses the privatization 
of family housing in addition to or in lieu of the military 
construction options. The Department's official policy is to 
rely on the local community as the first source of adequate 
and affordable housing, with new construction or 
public/private ventures used to make up shortfalls. There are 
three main alternatives available within the privatization 
option, all of which have been successfully used in the past. 
Included are the Section 801 Build-to Lease Program, Section 
802 Rental Guarantee Program, and the construction of mi 1 i tary 
family housing under Title 10, u.s.c. Section 2667. 
Congressional Budget Office studies suggest a plan in 
which numerous housing assets are retired, fewer new units are 
built, and personnel receive pay and allowance changes 
appropriate to provide the incentive to live in the civilian 
community. The intention is to have the savings generated 
from reduc~d maintenance, operations and new construction 
outlays outweigh the additional expenditures on allowances. 
B. TilES IS OBJEC'l'IVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate three of the 
options available to provide adequate and affordable family 
housing to Navy fami 1 ies in the continental United States 
3 
(CONUS). current Department of Defense policy will be 
compared to both the public/private option and the downsizing 
of housing assets (with pay and allowance changes} option. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the issues of each of 
the options wi 11 be conducted with appropriate recommendations 
made concerning the best alternative. For the purpose of this 
thesis, on-base housing refers to government owned housing. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis will analyze the issues and costs of each of 
the three options identified and make recommendations based on 
the comparisons of the three. It wi 11 only consider the 
alternatives for providing CONUS Navy family housing 
(excluding Marine Corps housing), analyzing the impact on all 
Navy personnel, both officer and enlisted. 
Excluded from this thesis will be any investigation of the 
consolidation of all services into a single Department of 
Defense housing organization, or the creation of a rental 
market within the Department of Defense housing organization. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Succeeding chapters wi 11 research the three fami 1 y housing 
options in detail and conclude with recommendations. Chapter 
II will provide an overview of Mavy family housing 
organization, eligibility and allowances. Chapter III will 
identify current Department of Defense policy, present Navy 
4 
family housing assets, and proposed Navy housing needs. The 
three public/private ventures will be discussed in Chapter IV, 
and the downsizing of Navy family housing assets with 
appropriate pay and allowance changes will be discussed in 
Chapter V. Chapters II, III and IV will also investigate the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the three options. 
Chapter VI will provide an analysis of the research leading to 
the conclusions and recommendations in Chapter VII. 
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II. NAVY MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING OVERVIEW 
A. ELIGIBILITY FOR NAVY FAMILY HOUSING 
Policy regarding the assignment to and utilization of Navy 
family housing is provided within OPNAVINST 11101.13H. The 
main objective of Navy managed family housing is to provide 
adequate housing to military families. Assignment procedures 
and utilization have been designed to provide the broadest 
opportunity for occupancy by the largest number of eligible 
personnel. Official Department of Defense pol icy is to 
construct family housing at those bases where affordable and 
adequate housing is not readily available in the local 
civilian community. 
Navy personnel, with accompanying dependents, who are in 
pay grades E-5 and above are eligible for Navy family housing. 
Personnel in pay grades E-4 and below, with accompanying 
dependents, must have two years of service before they are 
eligible. Base Commanding Officers are authorized to open up 
more housing to personnel in the rank of E-4 and bel ow not 
meeting the two years service criteria to reduce the financial 
burden to this group. Accompanying dependents are those which 
are expected to reside with the member for nine months out of 
the year. Military members without dependents are not 
eligible for Navy family housing. 
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B. ORGANIZATION OF NAVY FAMILY HOUSING 
Navy fami 1 y housing is maintained and operated by the 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), headquartered 
in Alexandria, Virginia. OPNAVINST 11101.13J provides 
guidance on the organization and management of family housing 
for all of the Navy. 
The typical housing organization is overseen by a housing 
manager with appropriate staff personnel. This staff does the 
administrative duties, inspections, referrals, and assists in 
the management of the inventory. The housing manager is 
responsible fer assignments, referrals, budgeting, 
maintenance, inspections and future planning. The housing 
manager will typically oversee a government housing 
maintenance organization or will contract out these services 
to a Public Works Center or private contractor. The manager 
will work for or closely with the Public Works Officer of a 
Navy Public Works Department, or will work for a Commanding 
Officer of a Public Works Center. 
Normally the base Commanding Officer wi 11 be the Area 
Housing Authority having final decision authority on all 
housing matters. The housing manager wi 11 report via the 
chain of conmand to the Area Housing Authority for all 
matters, both administratively and for budget purposes. The 
Area Housing Authority wi 11 then report to their normal 
superior for administrative and operational matters, but will 
submit budget requests for Navy fami 1 y housing to NAVFAC. 
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·. 
These budget requests will be r~~iewed and consolidated by 
NAVFAC and will form the basis for the Family Housing, Navy 
and Marine Corps Appropriation, a part of the Military 
Construction Bills in the budget process. All Navy and Marine 
Corps commands containing housing assets are required to 
submit budget requests for their housing to NAVFAC. 
C. FAMILY HOUSING, NAVY AND MARINE CORPS APPROPRIATION 
The Family Housing, Navy and Marine Corps (FH,N&MC) 
appropriation finances the cost of operating, maintaining and 
constructing family housing for the Navy and Marine Corps. 
The annual expenditures within this appropriation are intended 
to provide sufficient funding to operate, maintain, and 
improve units already in the inventory; renew 1 eases current 1 y 
being held on existing public/private ventures; and secure new 
leases or construct new units to eliminate the housing backlog 
in military communities. The appropriation has two subheads, 
the construction subhead with a five year obligation period, 
and the operations and maintenance subhead with a one year 
obligation period. 
Annually, the Department of the Navy must submit a budget 
request for funding to support the Navy family housing 
community as part of the overall Department of the Navy budget 
request to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The area 
housing authority for each Navy family housing community is 
responsible for providing input to NAVFAC, who will 
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consolidate all inputs and forward a budget request up the 
chain of command. 
The flow of funds begins once the budget is approved by 
Congress and signed by the President. The Treasury prepares 
Appropriation Warrants which are co-signed by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO). The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) then apportions the funds to the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF). The SECDEF, via the Office of the Navy Comptroller 
(NAVCOMPT} then allocates the funds to the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), who in turn allocates the funds to NAVFAC. 
NAVFAC is the central manager of the Navy and Marine Corps 
housing assets, and thus responsible for appropriate 
budgeting. NAVFAC separates the Navy and Marine Corps housing 
funds, then passes the construction funds via allocation and 
the operations and maintenance funds via allotment to the 
Engineering Field Divisions (EFD}. The EFD's then make debt 
payments for construction via allotment from the construction 
allocation. They pass funds to the Field Activities for 
maintenance and operations of family housing on a reimbursable 
basis. 
D. BOOSIBG ALLOWUCBS 
Housing allowances for personnel living in the continental 
United States include a Basic Allowance for Quarters {BAQ) and 
a Variable Housing Allowance {VHA). These allowances are 
nontaxable and vary according to the member's pay grade and 
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whether or not they have dependents. The BAQ rates are set 
annually, normally linked to the annual military pay raise. 
The VHA rates are also set annually for each geographical 
location, but by a much different method. Each year the 
Department of Defense gathers information on median 
expenditures by military families for housing in each military 
housing area, defined to be the geographical area t~~~ 
encompasses all public and private housing within 30 miles. 
within a 60 minute commute, of a military installation. This 
is done through the use of an annual survey of mi 1 i tary 
personnel living in private-sector housing. No distinction is 
made between renters and homeowners. The Department of 
Defense then sets the VHA rates for each paygrade and 
dependency status so that the median out-of-pocket cost 
(difference between local median housing expenditures and a 
member's BAQ plus VHA) is the same in both high-cost and low-
cost areas of the country. 
The BAQ and VHA received by the Navy member normally cover 
about 80 percent of what the typical military family spends 
for housing rent (or mortgage for homeowners) and utilities in 
the private sector [Ref 4:p. 7]. Families pay the remaining 
20 percent out of pocket from other income. The BAQ, the 
largest allowance, covers roughly 60 percent, while the VHA 
covers roughly 20 percent. 
All Navy personnel receive a BAQ. They may surrender it 
in exchange for housing on a Department of Defense 
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installation or they may spend it on housing in the private 
sector. Most members 1 i ving in the private sector and 
receiving BAQ will also receive VHA. Only those stationed in 
an extremely low cost area will not. 
VHA was enacted by Congress in 1980 to compensate families 
living in the United States for regional differences in the 
cost of housing. An offset policy came into effect in 1985, 
which requires full VHA to be paid only if the members housing 
expenditures are greater than or equal to their total 
allowances (SAO plus VHA). Thus, a recipient's payment will 
be reduced by 50 cents for every dollar by which their total 
housing allowances exceed actual expenditures. In no event 
will the amount of the reduction exceed the prescribed VHA for 
the member (Ref 16]. 
Internal memorandums within the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) suggest that the Department of Defense uses its 
policy on housing allowances to pursue four general policy 
goals (Ref 3:p. 64]. First, the Department of Defense wants 
the allowances to pay for a significant portion of adequate 
housing for the military member. Second, the allowances 
should offset variations in housing rents and alleviate 
hardships encountered as members transfer from station to 
station. Third, they should prevent any member from living in 
inadequate housing. And finally, the allowances should 
maintain the Department of Defense hierarchy; meaning 
allowances should rise as pay grade rises. 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STATUS QUO PROGRAM 
A. CURRENT POLICY 
The present policy within the Department of Defense, as 
stated in DODINST 4165.63H, is to construct or lease family 
housing only when personnel must be housed on-base to enhance 
military readiness or when the local community cannot or will 
not provide the housing required to support the mi 1 i tary 
population. 
There are numerous reasons why civilian communities may 
not provide moderately priced housing, the type frequently 
required by military personnel. Often environmental concerns, 
or a lack of suitable excess land for future development, 
restrict construction efforts. The local community may be 
unwilling to rezone an area to construct such housing. They 
may wish to maintain a higher residential real estate value, 
or the costs of rezoning (fire and police protection, roads, 
utilities, etc) may exceed the tax revenue base available to 
the coftl'ftunity. 
Due to these factors, the quantity of acceptable and 
affordable housing near many military bases is decreasing. 
Frequently, personnel stationed in the vicinity of 
metropolitan cities, or high cost areas, reside in housing 
which, according to Department of Defense standards is 
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unacceptable [Ref 8: p. 5]. This is significant since the 
majority of military families live within commuting distance 
of large civilian communities [Ref 9:p. 165]. 
The Department of Defense has an established method for 
determining the availability of suitable private sector 
housing. The first step is to determine the number of 
military families that will be stationed in a given area in 
the future, usually the next five or six years. Next, the 
Department of Defense subtracts from this the quantity of 
adequate and affordable housing available in the local 
community. The result is the "construction deficit," the 
statistic used as the basis for requests for funds to 
construct or lease additional units. 
Formal definitions of what constitutes acceptable housing 
in the private sector in terms of cost, distance to the base, 
and various physical characteristics are provided by the 
Department of Defense [Ref 4:p. 15]. Basically, housing areas 
located more than thirty miles from the base or requiring more 
than a one-hour commute are unacceptable. Further, a private 
sector unit is considered too costly if the rental cost 
exceeds a military member's housing allowance plus thirty 
percent of the national median expenditure for housing by 
military families in that pay grade who reside in the private 
sector (rent> BAQ + VHA + 0.3 *national median expenditure). 
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The Department of Defense's method also makes a 
distinction between private sector housing available for 
military personnel rather than civilian families. The current 
market share by pay grade is projected into the future. Thus, 
if E-4 and below personnel presently occupy ten percent of the 
acceptable private sector housing, the Department of Defense 
assumes they will occupy those plus ten percent of any 
additional units built. 
B. CORRD'l' NAVY FAMILY ROUSING ASSETS 
NAVFAC currently manages roughly 58,800 Navy family 
housing assets in the continental United States [Ref 13]. 
These units are located in all geographical locations, with 
the greatest density being 8, 000 units in the San Diego, 
California area. The inventory maintained by NAVFAC has been 
acquired under various housing programs and averages about 30 
years old. The vast majority of these units were built after 
World War II, but a few structures still remain which were 
built prior to the war. These relatively few, very costly 
units are almost exclusively on the "historical register" and 
must be maintained to certain high standards rather than 
retired. 
The earliest efforts to construct large quantities of 
government housing began in 1939 when the Lanham Rousing Act 
was introduced. This act provided for the construction of 
homes to house the workers who were building World War II 
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military bases [Ref l:p. 11]. Some of these homes were 
acquired by the Navy to house military members in the early 
1940's, and in fact a few are still carried on NAVP'AC'a 
inventory (although it is an insignificant amount). 
Most of NAVFAC's present inventory was constructed u~~er 
the Wherry Housing Act of 1949 and the Capehart Housing Act of 
1955. These were programs which allowed the Department of 
Defense to pay for the construction of homes with mortgages, 
thus reducing capital expenditures and enabling the Department 
of Defense to construct many more homes [Ref 1:p. 12]. All 
units built under the Wherry program have been acquired by the 
government, and virtually all which remain in use have 
undergone some type of renovation. Often the renovations have 
been significant reconfigurations to convert two units into 
one to keep pace with the Department of Defense's square 
footage requirements for fami 1 y housing. All of the units 
constructed under the Capehart program are also owned by the 
government, and many of these have also been renovated, 
although the renovations have tended to be less drastic. 
The remainder of HAVFAC' s housing inventory has been bui 1 t 
under the Military Construction (MILCON) program, mostly since 
the mid 1960's. The MILCON program allows the Department of 
Defense to construct new units on military installations, or 
purchase vacant units from a private party in the local 
community [Ref 12]. MILCON funds to support the program are 
approved by Congress in the annual budget. 
15 
C. PROPOSED NAVY FAMILY HOUSING NEEDS 
There is a fair amount of uncertainty regarding future 
family housing assets managed by NAVFAC. There appears to be 
a trend of slightly increasing funding while simultaneously 
reducing the inventory of assets. The greatest uncertainty 
arises from the unknowns within the base closure process 1 
which will determine which assets the Navy is to retire. 
The trend to slightly increase funding for Navy family 
housing is the result of various studies done by NAVFAC in 
recent years. NAVFAC determined that numerous quality of life 
improvements were needed to bring Navy housing up to 
Department of Defense standards. These improvements were 
programmed for in the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) of 
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. The 
improvements are scheduled to be funded at least through FY 
1998. 
NAVFAC established three priorities in the POM process as 
follows [Ref 12]: 
1. Renovation of existing assets. 
2. Improve responsiveness to all military members, both 
occupants and those requiring referral services. These 
improvements wi 11 be in the customer service areas of all 
housing offices and wi 11 encompass housing referral 1 
housing management, housing maintenance, and any other 
areas required to improve service. 
3. Reducing the housing deficit through construction or 
acquisition of assets. 
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The outlook is filled with uncertainty due to base 
closure, but certainly NAVFAC will be forced to retire some 
housing assets. As bases close so will the housing, although 
some of this will be offset by units constructed as part of 
the same base closure process. A conservative estimate is 
that NAVFAC will retire some 8,000 more units than will be 
constructed or bought in the continental United States (CONUS) 
by FY 1999, reducing the CONUS inventory to roughly 50,800. 
D. ADVAlfTAGES lUfD DISADVAlfTAGES OF THE NAVY STATUS QUO 
PROGRAM 
The principal advantage of the Navy's status quo program 
of increasing the percentage of Navy families occupying on-
base housing is its contribution to the quality of life of 
mi 1 i tary personnel. The waiting 1 ists for Navy housing 
indicate increased access to on-base housing would improve the 
overall quality of life of the military families, assuming 
Navy housing is a normal good, and military personnel are 
rational in that they respond to incentives. 
The overwhelming majority of military families living in 
Navy housing have chosen to do so voluntarily (relatively few, 
usually senior officers, are required to for readiness}. The 
military families are exercising economizing behavior to 
derive their maximum benefit. Thus, for whatever reason the 
military family has chosen to live in Navy housing, they have 
done so to enhance their total quality of life. The military 
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family may desire to live on-base to take advantage of the 
close proximity to on-base facilities, to enjoy the 
camaraderie of living in a military community, to enjoy the 
added security the base provides, or to respond to economic 
incentives (especially true in high-cost areas), all of which 
increase their quality of life. 
There are three disadvantages to the Navy's status quo 
program of increasing the percentage of Navy families 
occupying on-base housing. First, this policy is potentially 
more costly than downsizing housing assets as the Forces are 
downsized. It may be less costly to maintain the present 
percentage of Navy £ami 1 ies in on-base housing than to 
increase the percentage. Second, current Department of 
Defense policy, to primarily rely on the local community to 
provide housing, is contradicted due to the Department of 
Defense's methodology used to d..:termine the deficit of housing 
in the civilian sector. 
revitalizing existing 
considerable amount of 
sector. 
Third, constructing new units, or 
ones, is a process that takes a 
time as compared to the civilian 
As evidence of the first disadvantage, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has studied the long-run costs of 
Department of Defense and civilian housing, determining it 
costs more to provide DOD housing than to provide housing in 
the private sector [Ref 4:p 17]. This is true when the costs 
of construction and major repairs are considered along with 
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the operating and maintenance costs. The CBO's methodology 
compares what the federal government spends to provide 
military housing to what military families spend in the 
private sector. Data was compiled by paygrade and geographic 
distribution. The results of the CBO study show that, on 
average, the federal government spends about 35 percent more 
to provide military housing (excluding the costs of federal 
land) than military personnel choose to spend on housing in 
the civilian community. The CBO study is discussed further in 
the Appendix, with particular attention given to the accuracy 
of the costs and expenses cited. 
The second disadvantage to the Navy's status quo program 
derives from two weaknesses in the methodology used to 
determine the deficit of housing in the civilian sector. The 
first weakness is in the determination of the Maximum 
Allowable Housing cost (MAHC) , and the second is in the 
calculation of future private sector housing to be occupied by 
military families. 
The MAHC is used by the Department of Defense to indicate 
whether civilian housing is affordable. This measure is 
reached tor each paygrade when the military member spends 
their allowance plus 30 percent of the national median 
expenditure for housing for families in their paygrade. The 
MAHC is based on housing allowance levels, not total income of 
a family, and is therefore not a true measurement of economic 
hardship faced by a military family residing in the private 
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sector. A military family who receives a basic pay increase 
offset by an equalizing decrease in allowances (to consider 
tax implications) would see no change in total income, nor 
would there be any expected change in housing expenditure [Ref 
4:p. 15]. However, raising pay and lowering allowances would 
cause the Department of Defense to decrease its estimate of 
affordable housing units available in the private sector, and 
increase its estimate of military housing units needed. The 
lack of affordable housing could be an indication that 
allowances should be increased, not necessarily that new 
military housing should be constructed. 
The second weakness in determining the deficit of housing 
in the civilian sector is in the projection of future private 
sector housing to be occupied by military families. The 
Department of Defense assumes the present percentage of 
military families occupying private sector housing indicates 
the number of units the private sector will be able to s~pply 
in the future. The Department of Defense further assumes the 
same percentage of military families will occupy the future 
supply of private sector housing. This can result in a 
perpetual increase in the amount of military housing required. 
The number of military families residing in the private sector 
is dependent upon the amount of on-base military housing 
available. The percentage of military families residing in 
the private sector would be smaller in areas where a large 
amount of military housing units are available. The end 
20 
result is the estimated future requirement for military 
housing tends to be larger for locations and paygrades which 
presently benefit from a large number of military housing [Ref 
4:p 16]. 
As an example, assume on-base E-5/E-6 housing is readily 
available resulting in only ten percent of families in these 
two paygrades to be housed in the civilian community. The 
Department of Defense methodology assumes the civilian 
community can only accommodate ten percent of the E-5/E-6 
military families in the future. This assumption is suspect 
in that it does not truly reflect the civilian housing market. 
A more traditional long-run supply and demand model, focusing 
on the civilian housing market, could greatly alter the 
housing deficit cited for many locations. 
The third disadvantage to the Navy's status quo program of 
increasing the percentage of Navy families occupying on-base 
housing is that constructing new units, or revitalizing 
existing ones, is a process that takes a considerable amount 
of time as compared to the civilian sector. For many military 
housing construction endeavors, up to ten years expire between 
the identification of a housing deficit and the fulfillment of 
that deficit. The military construction process is cumbersome 
due to all the reporting and documentation requirements. 
Included are a market analysis, budget planning, environmental 
assessment, site . engineering investigation, Congressional 
authorization and appropriation, bid preparation and 
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selection, construction, acceptance and occupation. This 
process takes a minimum of four years, but to proceed this 
rapidly the project must be considered so critical that it is 
placed in the earliest year of the Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) upon identification. If the requirement is 
placed in an outyear of the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) then it may take the full ten years. Some projects 
continuously get pushed down in priority and never get funded. 
22 
IV. NAVY FAMILY HOUSING PUBLIC/PRIVATE VENTURES 
A. SECTION 801 BUILD TO LEASE 
The 1984 Mi 1 i tary Construction Authorization Act 
established the Section 801 Build to Lease program. Under 
this legislation, the government can lease a project built by 
a private developer [Ref 10:p. 1]. This legislation, which 
has been renewed annually with rel ati vel y minor changes, 
authorizes the Department of Defense to lease a newly 
constructed housing project from a private developer for up to 
twenty years. The legislation authorizes the Secretary of 
each service to enter into a specified number of contracts for 
housing projects of approximately 300 units. The number of 
contracts and size of the projects have varied each year, 
dependent upon Congressional legislation [Ref lO:p. 1]. 
The build to lease projects are authorized only in those 
areas where a documented and validated deficit in family 
housing exists. An economic analysis demonstrating an 801 
lease is cost effective compared to other housing alternatives 
must be submitted to Congress for approval. Congress has 21 
days to respond or the project is considered approved [Ref 
6:p. 25]. 
The dollar amount of the 1 ease is divided into two 
separate rents. The shelter rent is the amount needed to 
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amortize the cost of the construction and is held constant 
throughout the term of the lease. The maintenance rent is 
meant to cover the costs of maintaining the development after 
construction. This rent will change based on the Housing, 
Shelter, Maintenance and Repair Index of the "Economic 
Indicators", which are prepared for Congress by the Council of 
Economic Advisors. Additionally, the government will pay 80 
percent of any yearly increases in total general real estate 
taxes after the second year of the agreement [Ref 6:p. 7]. 
Various other specific conditions and restrictions apply 
to the Section 801 Build to Lease program [Ref 6:p. 7-8]: 
1. The project must be built on or near a military 
installation. 
2. Eligible service members are assigned quarters rent-free 
(member forfeits BAQ and VHA). 







4. Contracts may provide for the contractor to maintain and 
operate the project throughout the duration of the lease. 
5. tJni ts must be bui 1 t to Department of Defense 
specifications. 
6. The lease is set for a maximum of 20 .rears after the 
completion of the construction. 
The 801 Build to Lease program has two al ternativ"-
First, the contractor may build the housing project ~ 
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available government land on the military installation. Upon 
expiration of the lease the government may purchase or 
continue to lease the development. If the government is not 
interested in these two options then they can lease the land 
containing the development to the contractor for the 
contractor's own private use. 
The second alternative authorizes the Department of 
Defense to lease a housing development which is located off 
base. Upon expiration of this lease the government does not 
have the option of renewing the lease, but only has the option 
of purchasing the development for fair market value or 
allowing the lease to expire [Ref 11:p. 6]. 
B. SEC'l'IOM 802 REM'l'AL GUARAIITEE 
The Section 802 Rental Guarantee program was also passed 
under the 1984 Military Construction Authorization Act. Under 
this legislation the Department of Defense is authorized to 
guarantee up to 97 percent occupancy of a privately owned 
housing development when the owner gives first consideration 
for rental to service members. Again, the Secretary of each 
service is authorized to enter into a specified number of 
contracts for housing projects of approximately 300 units. 
The number of contracts and size of the projects have varied 
each year, dependent upon Congressional legislation [Ref 10:p. 
1]. 
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As with Section 801, the 802 Rental Guarantee projects are 
authorized only in those areas where a documented and 
val ida ted deficit in fami 1 y housing exists. An economic 
analysis demonstrating an 802 lease is cost effective compared 
to other housing alternatives must be submitted to Congress 
for approval. Congress has 21 days to respond or the project 
is considered approved (Ref 6:p. 25]. 
Section 802 Rental Guarantee carries the same conditions 
and restrictions as Section 801 Build to Lease, with the 
following exceptions [Ref 10:p. 7-8]: 
1. The rental guarantee may not exceed 97 percent of the 
units. 
2. The individual service member pays the rent expenses. 
The Department of Defense is authorized to pay a portion 
of the utility costs in the lease agreement to reduce the 
costs to the individual service members. 
3. Initial rents shall not be more than rents for comparable 
units in the same general area. Future rents can be 
revised to reflect market conditions. 
4. The agreed upon rental guarantee amount shall not be more 
than an amount equal to the shelter rent of the units as 
determined by amortizing initial construction costs. 
5. ?he rental guarantee is limited to a maximum of 25 years 
and is not renewable. 
6. If the owner does not maintain and operate the 
development at a satisfactory level, then the contract 
can be terminated. 
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C. ~I~LE 10 2667 LEASE 
Title 10 USC Section 2667 has existed for a number of 
years. It was intended to give the Secretaries of the 
services the authority to lease land under their jurisdiction 
to promote the public interest or national defense. It was 
first used to construct family housing by the Army in a highly 
successful program at Ford Ord, California. The private firm 
involved at Fort Ord both developed and managed the housing 
units with very positive results, however the closure of Fort 
Ord has prevented this site from being studied further. As 
the mi 1 i tary. fami 1 ies have transferred, a small portion of 
these units are being rented to civilians, while another 
undisclosed portion will be transferred to the Naval 
Postgraduate's plant property for custody and occupancy by 
students. The future of the remainder of these units is 
uncertain. 
The Title 10 2667 Lease program is similar to both the 801 
and 802 programs in that it utilizes the private sector to 
build family housing in an area where an established deficit 
exists. It differs from the Section 801 and 802 programs in 
the following ways [Ref 6:p. 27]: 
1 . Housing units are not required to be bui 1 t to the 
Department of Defense specifications. They will undergo 
a constructibility review by the Department of Defense, 
but the plana and specifications are not limited by 
Department of Defense standard specifications. 
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2. Lease periods are set for a m1n1mum of five years, but 
there is no maximum duration. 
3. Lease authority exists such that the service Secretary 
may lease non-excess federal property under their jurisdiction for construction purposes. This gives the 
service Secretary flexibility in choosing the 
construction site. 
4. All Section 2667 leases must be approved by the House 
Armed Services Committee. 
5. Section 2667 lease projects are not affected by the 
Davis-Bacon Wage Act. This act requires that standard 
wages, set by the Department of Labor I be paid to 
construction workers on most federal projects. 
D. ADVM'!AGZS A1Q) DISADVAlftAGZS OP PtJBLIC/PlUVA'l'E VEII'I'ORBS 
The prime advantage of using one of the public/private 
ventures vice military construction (MILCOR) is the potential 
cost savings. In fact I verifiable cost savings are the 
requirement to obtain the approval for a public/private 
venture. This verification is evidenced through a theoretical 
"rent cap" calculation, demonstrating the net present value of 
the public/private venture is at least five percent less 
costly than it would be to build under the HILCON program. 
The "rent cap" calculation is comprised of the payments to the 
developer over the life of the lease. The net present values 
for the 801 or 802 projects are strengthened because both have 
zero initial outlars [Ref 6:p. 42]. Dollars do not have to be 
provided in the Defense Authorization Bill to finance these 
programs. 
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Section 2667 projects have further potential for cost 
savings since the contractor is not restricted to the 
constraints imposed by Department of Defense designs, nor is 
the contractor required to pay the prevailing wages specified 
in the Davis-Bacon Act. According to an estimate provided by 
the National Association of Home Builders, the design 
constraints imposed by the Department of Defense add twelve 
percent to the cost of military housing as compared to similar 
private sector housing, with no significant increase in 
quality [Ref 14:p. 2]. The Davis-Bacon Act adds an additional 
five to fifteen percent to the construction costs for MILCON 
projects, according to some estimates [Ref 2:p. 32]. These 
two areas provide the potential for large cost savings. 
The disadvantages of public/private ventures, revolving 
around 1 egal and accounting problems, have rendered these 
programs completely ineffective over the past five years. The 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command will not pursue the 
public/private ventures until the problems are resolved, thus 
restricting their available options. 
The accounting problem results from the Office of 
Management and Budget's requirement that all lease purchases 
be scored. Scoring requires Congressional authorization and 
appropriation for the total cost of the proposed lease 
liability in the first year, even though payments would be 
made throughout the life of the lease. The Office of 
Management and Budget requires this to ensure there is no 
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circumvention of the Grarrvn-Rudman-Hollings Act, which 
prohibits the government from entering into a contract that 
obligates itself beyond the current fiscal year without 
authorization from Congress. 
The legal problems arise at the end of the lease period 
for any public/private venture undertaken on government 
property. There are unanswered questions pertaining to the 
proper compensation to a contractor who has clearly improved 
the government land [Ref 13]. Without clear precedence set, 
the legal personnel at the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command advise against any such undertakings. Both these 
problems have kept all the public/private ventures from 
reaching their full potential. 
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V. DOWNSIZING OF NAVY FAMILY HOUSING ASSETS 
A. MAINTAIN CURRENT PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES IN NAVY HOUSING 
There has been a gradual trend to rely on the Department 
of Defense housing more and more over the years since World 
War II. This appears contrary to the Department of Defense's 
policy of relying on the civilian community first and 
foremost, before any housing is acquired or constructed by the 
Department of Defense. This increased reliance has occurred 
over the past 50 years and has been tremendously difficult to 
detect at annual budget reviews. The Congressional Budget 
Office suggests that it could be halted by a legislated cap on 
the total number of Department of Defense housing units or on 
the percentage of mi 1 i tary fami 1 ies who can 1 i ve in Department 
of Defense housing [Ref 4:p. xv]. 
Under this alternative, the current percentage of Navy 
families residing in Navy family housing would be held 
constant. The intended result is to avoid further reliance on 
the Department of Defense housing without harming the quality 
of military life [Ref 4:p. xiv]. Thus, the percentage of 
families living in Navy housing in 1999 would remain at the 
1993 level of 24 percent instead of rising to 38 percent, as 
it would in the Department of Defense plan. 
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The force drawdown and base closures would be used to 
reduce housing inventories under this alternative while still 
maintaining access to family housing at the present rate. The 
majority of units taken out of service would be those 
requiring renovation or revitalization in the near future. 
Removing them would allow significant up-front savings in 
revitalization costs without any increase in the 
revitalization backlog [Ref 4:p. 35]. 
B. PAY UD ALLOWUCE INCD'I'IVES TO REDUCE DEMAlfD POR NAVY 
ROOSIRG 
The result of this option would be to reduce the demand 
for Navy family housing by effectively raising the price 
families are paying for it. An increase in a members BAQ and 
VHA would certainly alter their behavior when choosing between 
the Department of Defense housing and private sector housing 
based on simple supply and demand models. 
Under this option, waiting lists for the Department of 
Defense family housing should diminish in response to the 
higher prices service members would pay for that housing [Ref 
4:p. 44]. If allowances were set high enough, many 
installations would have a surplus of housing units which 
would allow the inventory of housing assets to be reduced. 
This would also reduce the reliance on the Department of 
Defense to provide housing, and more closely match official 
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Department of Defense policy to rely on the private sector for 
housing. 
The allowances would have to be increased in a manner 
which is equitable with local market conditions, and in such 
a way as to overcome four fundamental differences between the 
decision process of a member of the armed forces renting in 
the civilian community and a non-Department of Defense (non-
DOD) person (Ref 3:p. 49]: 
1. Military families find themselves in unfamiliar housing 
market~ more often than civilian families. This will 
probably cause them to make housing decisions on the 
basis of poorer information. Thus on the average, the 
military family may be expected to pay more for housing 
of a given type than their civilian counterparts. This 
tends to hold true in spite of the military's efforts to 
provide housing referral services. The civilian family 
tends to be much more familiar with an area of 
consideration as they normally move to a different home 
within the same geographic region of their present one. 
2. Military families tend not to remain in a rented home as 
long as civilian families and will not benefit as much 
from the rental discounts that civilian families receive. 
Again, the result is that the military family may be 
expected to pay more for housing of a given type than 
their civilian ~ounterparts. 
3. Military families that receive VHA with its offset 
policy, but do not spend more than their allowance on 
housing, perceive the existence of effective marginal 
subsidies to housing and respond by increasing the total 
amount, including the allowance, that they spend on 
housing. It is estimated that one in eight households 
receiving VHA falls into this category, thus for some 
military families higher expenditures on rental property 
would be observed [Ref 3:p. SO]. 
4. Military families can expect to remain in homes for a 
fairly short time, thus they can more closely tailor 
those homes to their desired consumption of housing. 
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This has offsetting effects. On the one hand, a family 
will skip the starter home and thus be paying more rent 
than their counterpart, while on the other hand a family 
may not buy a home to grow into thus paying less (Ref 
3:p. 51]. 
There are numerous similarities between the military and 
civilian families regarding housing. Both usually start out 
as renters, will receive discounts from their l~ndlords as 
they remain longer in a home, and will increase their demand 
for housing expenditures as they mature and their permanent 
incomes grow. This transition from renting to owning and 
occupying takes longer for the military family than the 
civilian family for four reasons [Ref 3:p. 51]: 
1. The stability that civilian families tend to achieve over 
time does not come to the military family since military 
families move more frequently and find it harder to 
justify the fixed costs of buying a home. The civilian 
family is able to take a long term point of view that 
allows them to amortize the fixed costs over more time 
and to hold the house as a hedge for use in the future. 
2. The military families not only move more frequently, but 
they do so at irregular intervals. Most military 
families have little control over permanent changes of 
station (PCS), and this uncertainty about how long they 
will live in an area reduces the relative attractiveness 
of owning a home for the typical risk averse household. 
Often military families must endure forced separations 
when their house cannot be sold in a timely manner upon 
the transfer of the sponsor. The result tends to be a 
delay in the decision to switch from renting to owning 
and occupying. 
3. The military families receive a larger portion of their 
gross income as nontaxable benefits than do civilian 
families. Thus at comparable points in their life 
34 
cycles, military families will have a lower taxable 
income and will often face lower marginal tax rates than 
their civilian counterparts. Since the tax benefits of 
home ownership are approximately proportional to the 
marginal tax rate, the tax code tends to offer the 
military family a smaller tax advantage from owning a 
home than it offers a comparable civilian family. 
4. Military families that expect to receive military 
retirement may save differently from otherwise comparable 
civilian families. A military family may view their 
future retirement as a form of forced savings which 
displaces the need for other forms of savings. A 
comparable civilian family without such a retirement will 
tend to take a much more active interest in accumulating 
assets, with a home being the first major asset sought. 
Again, this defers the military family from transitioning 
from renting to owning and occupying. 
Consolidating all the differences between the mi 1 i tary and 
civilian families it is clear that the military families will 
tend to spend more money for 1 ess housing than ci vi 1 ian 
families. Exactly how much is most difficult to derive. 
Frequent moves and uncertainty about them, combined with the 
smaller tax benefit from home ownership, raises the effective 
price of housing services to the military families. Thus the 
pattern is clear, but the magnitude is uncertain. 
C. ADVAII'l'AGES UD DISADVAII'l'AGES OP DOWNSIZING NAVY FAMILY 
HOOSIRG ASSE'l'S 
Potential cost savings is the principal advantage of 
downsizing Navy family housing assets to maintain the current 
percentage of military families occupying it. The majority of 
these savings would be in the next five years as Navy family 
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housing assets are retired at the same rate as the Porce 
drawdown. The emphasis would be to retire the housing units 
currently in the revitalization backlog to maximize the 
savings. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the 
potential savings for a permanent housing inventory reduction 
program [Ref 4:p. 20]. The details of the study are provided 
in the Appendix, and are summarized as follows: 
1. The present discounted value of federal savings from 
retiring rather than replacing a military housing unit 
would amount to $140,000 over the expected service life 
of a typical replacement unit. The expected service life 
is assumed to be 57 years. This takes into account 
savings from not constructing, maintaining, or operating 
the unit, as well as the costs of providing housing 
allowances to an additional family. 
2. The present discounted value of federal savings from 
retiring rather than replacing a military housing unit as 
part of a permanent inventory reduction would amount to 
$170,000. The discounted savings from eliminating 
subsequent projects is included in this figure as well as 
the savings determined above. 
3. The present discounted value of resource savings from 
retiring rather than replacing a military housing unit 
would amount to $90,000 over the expected service life of 
the replacement unit. Resource savings are federal 
savings minus the additional out-of-pocket costs mi 1 i tary 
families must expend to obtain housing in the civilian 
conmunity. 
4. The present discounted value of resource savings from 
retiring rather than replacing a military housing unit as 
part of a permanent inventory reduction would amount to 
$110,000. 
5. The present discounted value of federal savings from 
retiring rather than revitalizing a military housing unit 
would amount to $70,000 over the additional service life 
of the revitalized unit (assumed to be 22 years). 
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6. The present discounted value of federal savings from 
retiring rather than revitalizing a military housing unit 
as part of a permanent inventory reduction would amount 
to $150,000 over the addi tiona 1 service 1 i fe of the 
revitalized unit. 
7. The present discounted value of resource savings from 
retiring rather than revitalizing a mi 1 i tary housing unit 
would amount to $40,000. 
8. The present discounted value of resource savings from 
retiring rather than revitalizing a military housing unit 
as part of a permanent inventory reduction would amount 
to $100,000. 
The detrimental impact on the quality of 1 i fe of the 
military family is the principal disadvantage to downsizing 
the inventory of Navy housing units. The Department of 
Defense is committed to continually improving the quality of 
life of all military personnel. Downsizing the family housing 
inventory would, at best, hold the quality of life constant 
vice improving it. The impact would be felt most by the E-4 
and below personnel who would be among the first to lose 
access to Navy family housing. The E-4 and below personnel 
tend to be the group with the most severe need for Navy family 
housing and are normally assigned to the units that tend to be 
in the greatest need of revitalization. Thus by retiring 
these units this group feels the brunt of the impact. To 
overcome these disadvantages housing units would need to be 
redistributed from more senior personnel to the junior 




A. QUANTITATIVB ANALYSIS 
The quantitative analysis to follow is a comparison of the 
Department of Defense's status quo option and the 
Congressional Budget Office's proposed downsizing option as 
they pertain to Navy housing assets located in the continental 
United States. Numbers relating to the status quo option are 
rough POM figures obtained from NAVFAC [Ref 15 and Ref 17]. 
Downsizing option data has been derived based on data provided 
by the Congressional Budget Office [Ref 4]. 
Data has not been derived for the public/private ventures 
as they are possible under either the downsizing or status quo 
options. The public/private option is a site-specific 
decision based on a local cost-benefit analysis which must 
portray at least a five percent savings before approval. Thus 
the public/private venture option will be intentionally 
excluded from the analysis. Additional savings could be 
generated for the status quo or downsizing options if the 
scoring problem noted earlier can be alleviated to make the 
public/private ventures a viable option for providing new 
housing where required. 
Tabla 1 summarizes the data for the Department of Defense 
status quo proqram from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 
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2001. The percentage of Navy families occupying on-base 
housing is proposed to increase from 24 percent to 34 percent. 
Housing assets are proposed to decrease from ss,sco units to 
roughly 50,800 units. However the number of Navy families 
stationed in the continental United States will decrease at a 
greater rate than housing assets are retired, resulting in the 
increase in families housed in on-base housing. All figures 
are in millions of 1993 dollars. 
TABLE l NAVY STATUS QUO PROGRAM 
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The Congressional Budqet Office's proposed downsizing 
option is sUllllllarized in Table 2. Under this option the 
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percentage ot Navy families residing in on-base housing would 
remain constant at 24 percent allowing more housing assets to 
be retired. Savings due to possible maintenance or management 
stat! reductions are not addressed since they could not be 
accurately quantified. All figures are again in millions ot 
1993 dollars. 
TABLE 2 DOWNSIZING OPTION POTENTIAL SAVINGS 
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This option produces significant up-front savings as the 
majority or the assets baing retired would save revitalization 
costs. NAVFAC currently maintains a revitalization backlog ot 
roughly 2.4 billion dollars [Ret 17]. Thus, between fiscal 
year 1995 and fiscal year 1999 revitalization costs would be 
decreased and the backlog would not increase. In tact, the 
backlog could be decreased with the savings generated to 
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increase the overall quality of life of the military family. 
The outyears (fiscal year 2000 and beyond) produce savings 
mainly from reduced operations and maintenance costs due to a 
smaller inventory. 
School impact aid savings referred to are a direct result 
of having less military families living on-base. Payments are 
made to local governments based on the number of dependents 
living on federal land, thus exempt from paying local property 
taxes. The payments made on behalf of dependents residing on-
base are higher than the payments for those living in the 
private sector. 
The savings referred to in Table 2 are strictly budgetary. 
To effectively assess the alternatives, the Office of 
Management and Budget requires a cost-benefit analysis of the 
type described in the next section to be conducted [Ref 26]. 
B. QUALITATIVB PALYSIS 
The qualitative analysis in this section is based on a 
housing study conducted by the Air Force Academy [Ref 5], with 
inputs from the congressional Budget Office [Ref 4], and the 
Rand Corporation [Ref 3]. Various assumptions are inherent in 
the analysis concerning private housing markets near military 
installations. It is assumed that these local housing markets 
are perfectly competitive, and military families are free to 
choose between on-base or private sector housing in response 
to market conditions. Military families thus have full access 
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to information concerninq prices and correspondinq amounts of 
housing service. This information is obtained throuqh housinq 
referral services offered at the military installation, real 
estate aqents or other sources. 
Assumptions concerninq benefits and costs are also 
inherent in this analysis. Only the benefits and costs which 
pertain to the military family and the costs which pertain to 
the Department of Defense will be considered. All other 
economic entities (such as landlords, home builders and 
providers of non-housinq qoods} which are affected by a 
military family's decision to reside on-base will be excluded. 
However, as long as the prices facing these entities do not 
change, the analysis of the costs and benefits to the military 
families and the Department of Defense fully reflect the 
social costs. The benefits to the Department of Defense 
resulting from having a military community residing on base 
are also not taken into account when applying this framework. 
Readiness, morale and esprit de corps are likely to be 
enhanced, but difficult to accurately work into the modal. 
Based on these assumptions, there are three alternative 
housing consumption patterns associated with military families 
choosing to reside in on-base housing instead of private 
sector housing. First, a military family may consume more 
housinq service in on-base housinq, but at a point below their 
demand curve (lass quantity demanded), as compared to private 
sector housinq. Second, a military family may again consume 
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more housing service in on-base housing as compared to private 
sector housing, however the consumption will be at a point 
above the demand curve (more quantity demanded), but at a 
price below that of the same housing service in the private 
sector. Finally, a military family may consume less housing 
service in on-base housing as compared to private sector 
housing. 
Housing service is defined as [Ref 5:p. 4]: 
an unobservable good emitted in some quantity by each 
dwelling unit during each period of time. It is the one 
and only thing in a dwelling unit to which consumers 
attach value. Intuitively, the quantity of housing 
service emitted by a dwelling unit can be thought of as an 
index of both quantitative and qualitative attributes. 
In an attempt to relate housing service to a tangible 
quantitative measure, consider that each dwelling represents 
a unique bundle of characteristics. It has a location, age, 
size, design and other attributes which distinguish it from 
other units. Families tend to consume housing characteristics 
in these bundles (Ref 18:p. 185]. Perhaps the most convenient 
measure to conceptualize housing service is square feet. 
Housing characteristics have negative own-price effects [Ref 
18:p. 185]. That is, in cities where housing cost more per 
square foot, other things being the same, people tend to 
demand smaller houses. 
Further, housing characteristics are complementary with 
living space [Ref lS:p. 185]. People tend to consume housing 
characteristics in bundles of progressively higher quality 
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rather than making substitutions among characteristics and 
purchasing bundles that are quite heterogeneous in terms of 
quality [Ref 18:p. 185]. Thus, in the private sector, square 
footage is a close approximation of the utility referred to as 
housing service. 
One complication to using 
approximation of housing service 
square footage as an 
arises due to differing 
facility maintenance programs between on-base and private 
sector dwellings. The Department of Defense tends to spend 
more on day-to-day maintenance thus increasing the value and 
service life of on-base housing units [Ref 25]. The 
Department of Defense directs on-base housing units to be 
maintained at a high standard to house military families at a 
consistent paygrade. Private sector housing units could house 
families of decreasing incomes as the dwelling ages. 
Therefore, an amnunt of square footage in an on-base housing 
unit could provide a greater amount of housing service than an 
equal amount of square footage in a private sector dwelling. 
The result of this complication is that square footage cannot 
be used as an absolute approximation of housing service when 
comparing on-base and private sector housing alternatives. 
The following illustrations will utilize the income-
compensated demand curve, which represents the amount of 
housing service families are willing to purchase as a function 
ot its price, holding welfare constant. Normally, the results 
of a change in price could be separated into an income effect 
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and a substitution effect. The income-compensated demand 
curve shows, for any change in price, the resulting change in 
quantity demanded due to the substitution effect alone (Ref 
20:p. 152]. Thus, the following demand curves show what the 
military families will consume if there is no income effect. 
Further, assuming housing service is a normal good, the 
income-compensated demand curve will be steeper than the 
ordinary demand curve (Ref 20:p. 153]. 
In the long run, one would expect PN to be lower than Pc 
for various reasons. In general, the station Public Works 
forces are sized to support the readiness of the base 
resulting in the fixed set up costs being incurred. The 
government housing maintenance organization will augment the 
Public Works' forces with relatively minor tool and material 
additions. As a result, it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
the day-to-day maintenance costs per unit of housing service 
provided are cheaper for on-base housing than for comparable 
off-base housing. This is true even though more money may be 
spent by the government on each comparably sized unit. 
Relative to private sector housing, the quantity of housing 
service provided is increased to such an extent that, on net, 
P" can be reasonably hypothesized to be lower than Pc· 
Other factors which contribute ~o PN being lower than Pc 
are due to the base infrastructure. Utility plants and mains 
are required to support base facilities. These are expanded 
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to accommodate on-base housing which is cheaper than having to 
build all new utility services. Additionally, support 
services, such as police and fire protection, are also set up 
to support the base. They too are easily expanded to service 
on-base housing areas. The savings generated by avoiding 
initial set up costs and sharing fixed overhead costs tends to 
make PH less than Pc• 
Missing from this discussion concerning PH are the costs 
and benefits associated with the use of federal land for on-
base housing. Accounting for the land issue should reduce PH 
further. Many military installations had their boundaries 
established well before their on-base housing requirements 
were defined. on-base housing units were constructed on 
excess space that has low opportunity cost. The land utilized 
would represent a cost only if, in the absence of that 
housing, the land would be sold or used for another facility. 
The following notation will apply to all three figures in 
this section: 
QH : The quantity of housing service to which a 
military family is entitled to. 
fJc: 
The price per unit of ~· 
(PH • cost to the government/QN) 
The quantity of housing service in the private 
sector which represents the military family • s 
next best alternative. 
The price per unit of Qc. 
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The first alternative is illustrated in Fiqure 1. The 
consumption is at point F, which is below the demand curve. 
The military family represented in this example has chosen to 
consume more h~usinq service by living in on-base housinq as 
compared to their next best alternative in the privat~ sector, 




Pigure 1 Alternative 1 
Housing Service 
The military family has chosen to consume 0, housing 
service, which is greater than the private sector alternative 
by the quantity (q - Qc· Private housing service consumption 
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for this fami 1 y, point A, would have resulted in a tot a 1 
out 1 ay of PcOe. 
The net benefit to the military family in this alternative 
is equal to the increase in consumer surplus at point F 
compared to point A. This chanqe in consumer surplus is the 
difference between what a consumer is willinq to pay for a 
qood and what they actually pay when buyinq it [Ref 19:p. 
114]. Put another way, the increase in consumer surplus is 
the difference between the value of housinq service {the 
maximum amount a person will pay) and the price of housinq 
service {the amount actually paid) [Ref 2l:p. 168]. Thus, the 
net benefit is due to the increase in housinq service consumed 
and the increased income available to spend on non-housinq 
service. The net benefit ( chanqe in consumer surplus) is 
represented by the area ACFE + PcAEP1 = PcACFP1 • 
Fiqure 2 illustrates the second alternative housinq 
consumption pat tern associated with mi 1 i tary fami 1 ies choosing 
to reside in on-base housinq instead of private sector 
housing. In this example, the military family again consumes 
more housinq service in on-base housing as compared to private 
sector housing. The consumption will be at point G, which is 
above the demand curve# but at a price below that of the same 
housing service in the private sector. 
The military family's next best private sector alternative 
is again at point A, thus the increased housinq service 
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consumed by the military family is Q1 - Qc· The total outlay 







The net benefit to the military family in this alternative 
can be broken down and analyzed in two parts; the housing 
service from 0c to O,• and from O,• to 0,. The net benefit to 
the family for housing service between Qc and (q• is equal to 
the increase in consumer surplus at point r compared to point 
A, which is the area PcAFP1• For housing service between Qr• 
and 0, the outlay exceeds the benefit by the area PGC. Thus, 
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the total net benefit to the military family is equal to PcAFP1 
minus FGC. 
The final alternative housing consumption pattern 
associated with military families choosing to reside in on-
base housing instead of private sector housing is illustrated 
in Figure 3. The military family consumes less housing 
service in on-base housing instead of private sector housing 
by the quantity Oc - Q1 . The consumption is at point F, which 
is below the demand curve. Again, the next best alternative 
in the private sector is point A, which would result in a 
total outlay of PcOc· 
The net benefit to the military family in this example is 
equal to the increase in consumer surplus at point F compared 
to point A. This is represented by PcBFP1 minus ABC. 
Ni th the three alternatives in mind, the goal is to 
portray that the Department of Defense has an economic 
justification to provide on-base housing when considering 
qualitative as well as quantitative data. Essentially, if an 
average (mean) net social benefit per family for a given 
paygrade is obtained, then there is an economic justification 
for the Department of Defense to provide on-base housing [Ref 
S:p. 17]. 
The illustrations portrayed in Pigures 1, 2 and 3 result 
in a net benefit to the military family as evidenced by the 
increases in consumer surplus resulting from the military 






Pi9Ure 3 Alternative 3 
living in the private sector. It thus becomes critical to 
consider the qualitative issues in addition to the 
quantitative issues. Empirical studies performed by the 
United States Air Porce Academy [Ref 5] have confirmed that 
there is an average net social benefit per family for all 
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paygrades, thus providing an economic justification for the 
Department of Defense to provide on-base housing. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three recommendations arise as a result of this research. 
First, the procedures used to set VHA rates in geographical 
regions should be revised. Measures should be taken to 
consider the local housing market instead of only the actual 
expenditures of the military families residing in the private 
sector. Second, the housing deficit should be determined by 
a long-run housing market analysis instead of a straight 
projection of the current market share occupied by military 
families in the private sector. Finally, the scoring issue 
needs to be resolved to make the public/private ventures a 
viable option. 
1. Revise VHA Deteraination Procedures 
currently, the Department of Defense sets VHA rates 
tor qeoqraphic reqions based on actual expenditures of 
military families residinq in the private sector. The problem 
with this method is a result ot the economizing behavior of 
the rational military family. Military families livinq in 
hiqh cost areas tend to economize and qet less housinq service 
than those in lower cost areas. 
Figure 4 illustrates the analysis currently used by 
the Department of Defense. The typical military family's 
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demand curve is portrayed by o. The demand curve assumes that 
an increase in income will result in an increase in demand for 
housing service when price is held constant. Further, an 
increase in price will result in a decreased demand for 




Long-Run Housing Market Analysis 
These assumptions concerning demand are consistent 
with empirical studies of the elasticities of demand for 
housing service which estimate the income elasticity to range 
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froa 1.2 [Ref 18:p. 211] to 1.5 [Ref 18:p. 91] and the price 
elasticity to range from -0.55 [Ref 19:p. 112] to -1.2 [Ref 
18:p. 211]. 
In this illustration, when the local market price 
equals Pc the military family will consume Q1 units of housing 
service for a total outlay equal to PcQ1 • The demand curve 
shifts to o• with the addition of VHA to the military family's 
income, however the additional spending on housing service may 
not equal the VHA. As a result of th VHA, the military family 
buys <q additional units of housing service at price Pc· The 
total consumption of housing service by the military family in 
this example is then Q,. 
Before discussing a recommended approach to 
determining VHA, it may be useful to review current Department 
of Defense procedures for calculating VHA. The Department of 
Defense's current goal is to set VHA rates that vary for each 
geographical region and each paygrade, and are related to the 
standard for square feet and quality that the Department of 
Defense has specified. The resulting VHA calculation then is 
as follows: VHA • P1 - BAQ- (0.15 *I). The (0.15 *I) term 
represents the 15 percent out-of-pocket expenditures the 
Department of Defense has established for military families 
residing in the private sector, and the P1 term reflects the 
price of an approved dwelling. Values for P1 could possibly 
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be obtained from Department of HousiN, and Urban Development 
statistics on fair market rents. 
A change in the VHA determination procedures would 
tend to make the allowances fairer to families stationed in 
high cost regions. As stated earlier, military families in 
high cost regions hold down expenditures by purchasing less 
housing. These families tend to reside in smaller units or 
units of lesser quality than the military families stationed 
in lower cost regions. Because the current VHA system bases 
the levels of allowances on local expenditures by military 
personnel, allowances in high cost locations reflect the cost 
of lower quality units [Ref 4:p. 47]. 
Fiqure 5 illustrates the recollllllended VHA determination 
procedure. consider the effect a military family will feel 
when transferred from a low cost to a high cost region. 
Again, the compensated demand curve is portrayed. First, 
assume the military family transfers from Norfolk, VA, where 
the price of housing is $1 per unit, to Washington, o.c. where 
the price of housing is doubled. If the military family 
consumed 900 units of housing service in Norfolk at $1 per 
unit, then at $2 per unit in Washington they will consume 
less. Next, assume the military family will consume 600 units 
at the higher price per unit. 
The military family will spend more money in 
Washington for less house than they had in Norfolk. This is 
the disparity caused by the current VHA determination 
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procedures. The net loss to the military family is equal to 
the decreased consumer surplus due to the move from Norfolk to 
Washington [Ref J:p. 16]. This is represented by areas A and 







600 900 Units of Housing 
Possible Effect of PCS Transfer 
A and B would represent the extra VHA a military family would 
need to live at the same level of housing service in 
Washington, D.c. Further analysis would be required to 
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determine which region would become the baseli -e, but this 
would be the procedure used to determine VHA entitlements. 
2. Revise Housing Deficit Determination Procedures 
The Department of Defense determines the projected 
housing deficit in any geographical location by holding the 
current market share constant for each paygrade. This assumes 
the present percentage of military families occupying private 
sector housing indicates the number of units the private 
sector will be able to supply in the future and that the same 
percentage of military families will occupy the future supply 
of private sector housing. As an example, assume on-base E-
5/E-6 housing is readily available resulting in only ten 
percent of families in these two paygrades to be housed in the 
civilian community. The Department of Defense methodology 
assumes the civilian community can only accommodate ten 
percent of the E-5/E-6 military families in the future. This 
assumption is suspect in that it does not truly reflect the 
civilian housing market. A more traditional long-run supply 
and demand model, focusing on the civilian housing market, 
could greatly alter the housing deficit cited for many 
locations. 
Figure 6 illustrates the proposed market analysis. De 
represents the demand curve for a civilian community assuming 
there is no local military installation. Dc+w represents the 
total demand curve when the military families are considered. 
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SU is the long run supply curve. Over the long run,
analysts believe that the supply of housing in most U.S.
markets will be quite elastic (Ref 4:p. 58]. This is related
to the time it takes for suppliers to respond to possible







Figure 6 Long-Run Housing Market Analysis
The long-run supply curve for housing can be
investigated in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas
land is not scarce, and the price of land does not increase
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substantially as the quantity of housing supplied increases. 
Further, the other costs associated with construction would 
also not increase because there is a national market for 
materials. Therefore, the long-run elasticity of the supply 
of housing is likely to be very large [Ref l9:p. 277]. Recent 
studies have found the long-run supply curve to be nearly 
horizontal. The same holds true in urban areas even though 
the land costs rise as the demand for housing services 
increases. The long-run elasticity of supply will still be 
large because land costs make up only about one quarter of 
total housing costs [Ref l9:p. 277]. 
This conventional supply and demand model can be used 
to identify the actual housing deficit for any geographical 
location. In Figure 6, the Maximum Allowable Housing Cost, 
MARC, is set below the equilibrium price of private sector 
housing when no on-base housing exists, P0• In this 
illustration, segment AB is the number of military families 
the private sector can house without driving the equilibrium 
price above the MARC. Segment BF would thus represent the 
housing deficit at the MARC that would cause the price to rise 
to P0• 
Basic supply and demand analysis is an improvement 
over the current Department of Defense procedure for 
determining the housing deficit. ~he proposed model would 
tend to consider both military demand as well as possible 
decreases in the number of existing units that are occupied by 
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civilian households as a result of the pressure of military 
demand [Ref 4:p. 58]. This type of analysis provides a more 
traditional justification for constructing new housing where 
a deficit can be shown and where on-base housing is more co~t 
effective. Further, current deficits might be eliminated 
where a 1 argo, well established private sector community 
exists that is capable of increasing supply to meet shifts in 
demand. 
The Department of Defense would still need the 
flexibility to respond to any special circumstances in all 
geographical regions. Some well established housing markets 
may lack the resources or may be unwilling to increase supply 
to respond to shifts in demand. This unwillingness would tend 
to affect the junior enlisted personnel more than any other 
groups as they have the greatest need. Thus, the Department 
of Defense should use this type of analysis in conjunction 
with a review of any special circumstances to determine the 
true housing deficit. 
3. Elindnate the Scoring of Public/Private Ventures 
The main disadvantage of the public/private ventures 
is the scoring issue, discussed earlier in Chapter IV, which 
has rendered these programs completely ineffective over the 
past five years. The Office of Management and Budget requires 
that all lease purchases be scored requiring Congressional 
authorization and appropriation for the total cost of the 
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proposed lease liability in the first year, even though 
payments would be made throughout the 1 if e of the 1 ease. 
Thus, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command will not pursue 
the public/private ventures until the problems are resolved, 
thereby restricting their available options. The Office of 
Management and Budget requires public/private ventures to be 
scored to ensure there is no circumvention of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, which prohibits the government from 
entering into a contract that obligates itself beyond the 
current fiscal year without authorization from Congress. 
Scoring is a political issue which needs to be 
addressed in the political arena with an emphasis on economic 
justification. Significant savings could result if the 
requirement were relaxed by the Office of Management and 
Budget since at least a five percent savings must be proven 
before a public/private venture can be undertaken in place of 
a MILCOH project. Therefore it is in the best interest of the 
Department of Defense for the public/private ventures to 
become a viable option once again. 
B. CORCLOSIORS 
Four conclusions result from this research. First, the 
Department of Defense does have an economic justification for 
providing on-base housing. Second, with this justification in 
mind, the emphasis should be to "right size", not necessarily 
to downsize. Third, if assets are to be retired, then those 
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units on the revitalization backlog should be considered 
before newly remodeled units when possible. Finally, the 
VHA/BAQ determination procedures should be revised to equalize 
the welfare of the service members and their families between 
high cost and low cost regions. 
The bottom line is that the total quality of life of the 
military families should be considered first and foremost as 
decisions are made concerning on-base housing. The total 
welfare of the families, especially the junior enlisted 
families with the greatest need, must be the emphasis of any 
analysis. Such a study must look beyond the quantitative data 
and include the qualitative aspects. 
1. The DOD Should Provide on-Base Rousing 
The Department of Defense has an economic 
justific~tion for providing on-base housing for military 
members. The empirical cost-benefit analysis (completed along 
the lines described previously) is the key factor which must 
be investigated to consider the benefits to the mi 1 i tary 
families as opposed to the costs to the Department of Defense. 
On-base housing is necessary to relieve the burden in areas 
where the 1 ocal co111nuni ty cannot or wi 11 not increase the 
supply of housing to respond to the shift in demand due to the 
addition of military families. Further, on-base housing 
enhances the total quality of life of military families which 
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occupy it and produces intangible benefits to the Department 
of Defense (readiness, morale, esprit de corps and so forth). 
2. Pocus on "Right-Sizing" Housing Assets 
The focus of all the analysis should be to "right 
size" the inventory of on-base housing. There should not be 
any arbitrary quotas or cei 1 ings set to downsize housing 
assets as the Forces are downsized. If a true housing deficit 
can be proven by traditional supply and demand analysis, then 
options should be pursued to alleviate the shortage. The 
method used to determine the housing shortage should be 
revised to reflect a more traditional approach. Further, the 
public/private ventures should be one of the options available 
to reduce the deficit if the Department of Defense is to get 
the most housing service for the money. 
3. Investigate the Revitalization Backlog 
If assets are to be retired to reduce the size of the 
housing inventory, then those on the revitalization backlog 
should be looked at as the first to go. NAVPAC currently 
maintains a large backlog which includes assets from virtually 
all geographical regions. It is common sense to retire these 
assets first to save the revitalization costs as well as 
future operations and maintenance costs. A simple cost-
benefit analysis at each region requiring a reduction of 
assets could confirm this. 
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4. Revise VHA and BAQ Determination Procedures 
The VHA/BAQ determination procedures are in need of 
revision or total overhaul. Currently, military families 
residing in high cost regions tend to qet less house for a 
greater tot a 1 out 1 ay. 'l'his unfairness could be reduced 
substantially if the procedures used to determine the VHA and 
BAQ rates were changed. The recommendations section covered 
this in greater detail. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Two topics could be pursued in greater detail. First, a 
rental market system could be investigated for military family 
housing to force competition with the private sector. Second, 
more analysis could be performed on the real value of military 
family housing. The initial price of on-base housing may be 
lower than off-base housing because the land has a low 
opportunity cost. Further, it is accepted that more money may 
be spent to operate and maintain military housing, but this 
may correspond to an increased value of the housing assets as 
well as an extended life. By spending more on housing 
maintenance the slope of the depreciation curve may be 
decreased and the useful life may be increased. Thus, while 
similar sized housing units in the private sector may 
deteriorate and eventually house lower income families, 
military family housing units retain families of the same 
income group. Thus, military family housing units maintained 
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at a higher standard may cost less over the long run. It is 
hypothesized that the military unit should be depreciated 
starting from the price of the off-base unit, as this 
represents the fair market value. 
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APPDDIX 
The two pages to follow (70 and 71) are an excerpt from a 
Congressional Budget Office report on military family housing in 
the continental United States (Ref 4]. The numbers presented are 
not exact I but merely useful averages from which preliminary 
decisions and analysis can be drawn. The data suffers from three 
main weaknesses resulting from differences in characteristics I 
differences in how costs are measured, and differences in which 
costs are covered. 
First, the Department of Defense and private sector housing 
have different characteristics which make it difficult to make 
comparisons between the two. As stated earlier, housing service is 
a bundle of goods which represent various levels of worth to each 
~litary famdly. Thus, it is hard to categorize a civilian and an 
on-base house as equivalent for study purposes. We might 
hypothesize, however, that more housing services are provided in 
on-base housing than off-base housing for comparably sized 
dwellings. This hypothesis is consistent with the high operations 
and maintenance expenditures reported by the Congressional Budget 
Office, and presented in Figure 6 of this appendix (page 71). 
Further, housing services may be increased for the on-base 
dwelling due to the school impact aid. One may hypothesize that 
this subsidy increases the quality of the schools where dependents 
housed on-base attend. The amount the school receives for 
dependents housed on-base is much greater tha~ "'le amount they 
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would receive from taxes if the family were housed in the private 
sector. Thus, the military family residing on-base may be provided 
more housing services due to the benefit received from their 
dependents attending a school of higher quality. 
Secondly, the Department of Defense measures costs differently 
than units in the private sector. As an example, costs per square 
foot can differ because the convention that the Department of 
Defense uses to measure square footage is not the same as that used 
by most private builders [Ref 4:p. 17]. Thus, all comparisons must 
be viewed with skepticism as judged on their own merits. 
Finally, differences in the way costs are covered will affect 
comparisons. Support services (streets, utilities, fire, police, 
access to schools, access to recreational facilities ... ) are 
incorporated differently into the costs of construction by the 
Department of Defense and private sector housing developers. It 
becomes relevant whether costs appear as initial construction 
costs, or whether they Are paid for gradually over the life of the 
housing unit. 
With the previous d±scu$~:~n in mind, it is apparent that it 
is difficult to accurately compare the costs of on-base and private 
sector units. As stated, it is difficult to determine units on and 
off-base which have equal amounts of housing service. There are 
also difficulties with the sample selection. Personnel living on-
base may not necessarily spend the same as personnel living off-
base. Purtber, personnel living off-base may not be doing so 
wi 11 ingly, as they may be waiting for on-base housing. Other 
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families may attach greater housing services to units off-base and 
thus may choose to reside off-base. There are thus problems 
associated with the weighting, as well as problems resulting from 
the military families' choices. 
To further complicate the comparisons, it is unclear what the 
impact would be on the private sector housing costs if the on-base 
housing were removed. As an example, consider the impact on taxes 
due to the loss of school impact aid. The schools may need to 
generate more revenue to replace the loss, thus taxes may go up. 
This would increase the out-of-pocket expenses and decrease the gap 
between on-base and off-base housing costs. 
The data contained in this appendix thus represent averages 
based on various Congressional Budget Office assumptions. Again, 
the numbers are not hard, fast figures, but rough figures to be 
used for preliminary decisions and analysis. 
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Box l. 
Decisions About DoD Housing Inventories: flow Much Money Will They Save'! 
Cumpaarin~ annu&&l CU:ib uv~r Lh~ lun~ run tu:l in Fig-
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CBO calc:uluttd • "pre::~ent discounted" value fur 
th011e :aavin11 by d~countinl future :aavint~J at u :J 
percent 11nnuul rate. 'rhal. approach tllke::~ into ac:· 
cuunt the fact tlu&t such savint~t an worth le:t:i thun 
curr41fnt :Wvin~:a to tuduy'::~ tuxpuy~u. 
CBO ~tlltimated that the pre:aent Ji:t4:ounted v~&l· 
u1 uf tcd•r•l s.-vin1:1 from r~~ttirinl rather thatn r~­
pl~tcinl ll DoD unit would lllllUUOt to u~o.ooo ov~r 
the upected ::~ervic:-. life u( a typical reploc:tm•nt 
unit. tTlu•t eatimute &l:i:iume:a !An ~txpec:ted lift of 57 
y~t•n fur th• re=pluc•na•nt unit; :~ee Appendix C for 
dttlllil:u 'l'h• e:~tinaat.= tuklhl intu account wlaot llut 
~overnmenL :la&Yd:t by not con:atruc:tinc, U(WrUtin~. 
•nd 11111inuainin1 th111 unit throu~&hout ibl iervic:e lif~t 
a:~ wttll A:i the co.ts incurred in providin1 hou:~inllll· 
luwancu to •n addith>n&&l fatnally. If DoD retin:1 
r11ther th•n replau:e=a a unit u p~trt o( aa perm11nent 
inventOC'y r.duction, thtt dhlc:uunt~td pre~~&ent value uf 
fed•ral uvin~&s is $170,000. That ~t:itiuuate inc:ludca 
b.Kh the $l-40,000.iavltd by forcoin1 th• initial r•· 
ph•c:en1ent project a• well •• th• di:acounted ~vinll~ 
from for~&oinl(subMquent prtJjec:U. 
Oecidinc to retire rather th•n replace • DoD unit 
bu ctCUnomic: impau:u b•yond tho~Mt that appear in 
tlw ftnl.ral budlfe\. When DuD r.dut!t:l i~ inven· 
tOC'ia, tul&ll r•~Wurce ~avin11:1 11nt leu than fttderal 
11avin11 becaauae wcJtl f11cnilies mu:1t p•y out-of-
pocket ccwu to ubtain hou:~inc in the private .ector. 
CBO atimated th•t the pres.tnt di*=ounted value of 
re.uurce :aavinl(t tthat is, ftK!eral :~avin~s lea thtt lld-
ditiun•l out-of-pock•t \.'thlll of military pttuonn•B 
70 
would c&nauunL to $90,000 uvcr lhe up~cted ~rvice 
hf• uf tht: r~piMce=ment unit. If the invtntury reduc· 
tiun Willi flcrman~nt t::;o th&tt th~tre wer• Ji::;counted 
:aavinK:t from furgoinll :aull:acquent rejJIMcement ~tnd 
revituli~alion projec.:tal, Lhu::t~t ruource .:iMving::& 
would equul $llO,OOU. 
&vings from aa dcci:aionto retire rather than re-
vitalize a unit ca.n ai:W btt ':;ub:ahanti¥1. CBO c:~li· 
UU&ted that the prbt=Ot diaeount~td Vlllue of f~dcraal 
::&avinaf:t from :iuch &l &.lec.:i:iiun would amount to 
$70,000 over lhd additiunol :icrvice liftt oJf the nvi-
taliud uniL. 1'rhut c::ttimatl! u:aumc:t that rttvitttli~u­
Liun add:a ap(lroximutt:ly 2:! yeari to the :~ervic.:e life 
of a unit; ::~ee App~nJix C fur J~ttail:t.l lf Jeciding nut 
to r-.viuali~e u unit re:tulted in ll perm11ncmt reduc-
tion in DoD invttntoritt:t t:to that thtt collti of future 
nplac:em~nt and revitiali~utiun prujccts were avoid-
ed), th• fu~cruli(OY~trnmcnt woulJ :auve $l50,000 in 
Jiacuunt~&.ll~ruaa. CUO c:ttunut~:::t thut r~:tuurc:e ::~av­
inl(:l 1t'e=deral :auvin~:t l~:ai the aut·uf-poc:kc=t cu:~ts uf 
military pcr:aonn•ll wuuld equal appruxim&&l~tly 
$~0.000 durin1 the :Utrvic:e lif~t af the revitali~ttJ 
unit. The re:auurctt ::&uvinl(:l from Jttc:i~in" to rt:dt.u:t: 
DoD's inventory permanently by rtttirinar rath~tr 
than rcvituli~tng .a unit would be up(Jruximatt:ly 
$100,000. 
Euch ut' th~tlie c:~Limute:i i:a based on the ::&anae 
dat.- fur DuO and Lhc privut~t :tec:tor that were u:acd 
fur th• annuul coat c:ttimutea shown ttatrlier lice Fit~· 
ure ri on pu"tt 1fJ. In nuany resp.cu, they are :timply 
a difT•r•nt way ul' pr•aentinl the :aam• inf1•rmation. 
Fur d:&ampl~t, lt'i~ur.t 6 indic:ahtli tbut in annual 
term:t, DoD unitl6 ~t Sa,Jao more thlln private-
:t~Ktur uniu tes.cludinc the co::~t uf u:~in1 federal 
lund». [f u :l pe:rc:ent unnulll di:acount rate was ap-
plittd, a pern1unctnt :tavinar~ atre•m of $3,:!00 a year 
would bave a vaalue cuday uf $ll0,000. 'rhat ticure i:1 
th• ntinuated lillYiOI~ in tiiS:iOurc:es from • polic.:y de-
ci:tiun to r•duc:e the DuO ~nvcntory permanently by 
retirint~ ruthe:r thun rwplucin~& ll :iin~&le unit. Bet· 
t:IIU*l the ~::»timatt=~ ot' pce:acnt di"uunted :ia&vinl(i 
prwented her41t ar• buli~td un the :ia&nue data 1111 the 
c=»lima&tes in Fi.,urtt ti, the limitatiuni and unc~trtain­
titta thut aapplv to Lh•t earlier ~:cwt l!ompari:ton alao 
!Apply to lh~t:te c=atimute:a. 
fi<Jure 6. 
Average Annuallong·Run Costs of OoO Housing Compared with Private-Sector 
Housing Obtained by Military Families (In t 993 dollars) 
OoO Unit Private-Sector Unit 
SOURCE; Congteuiocwlludgec Office bfted on data ftom the Oep•nmenu of Oefen~e And El.lucation. 
NOTE: The figu11 comPMIIthe .,.,•9• cosc of • Oe,wnmenc of Defense (DoO) unn •n the Uniced St•ces with wh•t f•milies now living 
"'those until would·ch0011 co spend to obutin houwng in the privilll sector. 11 •nume~ U\•t such f•.nilies would spend. on 
•verAge, the wen.t •mount co obc•in ptiv•t•·t~etor 1\out~...,. •• IUnll•r meliuey f••mlie• llh•c is, f•mllies in 1h1 wme ~ygr.ae 
•~W loc•tiOf\» who do livetn tuiw•&e·IC(IOI houliRIJ. ll•s noc nccet~•nly • cOtnp.AniOn bet-en ""'"of equ•l value in the eyes 
ot melit••Y f•milld. ; 1 
•· Conslluction coscs w111 •monized ov11 lhl SMYtCelile of the unic using •n interest ••ll of l p.iicenc. This estimAte •ssumes th•c 
lflttWI conslluc:llon coscs Ml SIOO.OOO, m•c 11niU .,. revitMilld •' • cosc of SOO.OOO •Iter lS ye•n. •nl.l ch•c uniu .1r1 reurld 22 
ye•u •"" beiRIJ revitAlized. •• 
b. Tlw •v•rAgelmp..:c Aid p.Ud by the Oep.nmenc of Educ•tion on both•lf of chtt childten of f••ntlies living in OoO unecs less che •vii· 
o~ye cost of ct .. p•ym•n& we would be ,....,f mos. f•enllies lived"' houling in 11 .. ptiv•tc ilK: lOt. 
c. Th4t cosc of holdint tand. II usumes dwc IAftd f01 • OoO unit is wolth S 15,000. on •ver•g•. •nd thAt the •nnu.a cost to the fotder•l 
govet nn .. nt of holding .,. aset 11 ttqu.a co l percent of ili v.aue. 
d. Thiscoc•l impticilly includes •II of 11\1 coscs•Ptatic•bte co hout~NJ •n che Pf•v•&e Me lOt. tncludiniJ re•l .esc•c• •••es. th11 cosc of m••n· 
l.lliiRCI •.W Ulllllill, Ct\1 COIC of hokfu\g l.and. d•pttcl.liOn, .11\d tnllrtU. 
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